The Chief Justice (ag) held that house-to-house registration was constitutional but that registered persons could not be removed from the list merely for not being re-registered. The CCJ upheld COTED's classification of Rock Hard cement in its original jurisdiction. It also explained when an order on appeal from a tribunal can go further. GECOM brought house-to-house registration to an end on 31 August.
On 29 August GECOM made the National Registration (Residents) (Amendment) Order 2019 (Order No. 68). It substituted 31 August 2019 for 20 October 2019 as the end of the house-to-house registration period set by Order No. 25.
On 6 August, in consolidated original jurisdiction proceedings, Trinidad Cement Ltd v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2019] CCJ 4 (OJ), the CCJ declared that COTED's decision to classify Rock Hard cement as "Other hydraulic cement" was validly made. It attracts a common external tariff of 0–5 per cent rather than the 15 per cent on "Building cement (grey)". The decision binds member states under article 29(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. The Court noted that the World Customs Organization's interpretation, and the need for international harmonisation, had weighed heavily on COTED, and that most member states gave significant weight to the WCO's classification opinion. The originating applications by Trinidad Cement Limited and Arawak Cement were dismissed, and those by the Rock Hard companies were granted in part.
In Solomon v Dawattie [2019] CCJ 16 (AJ), reported at [2019] GLR 306, the CCJ gave reasons on 16 August for having dismissed, at the end of the hearing, four consolidated applications for special leave to appeal. The applicants were rice-land tenants facing notices to quit authorised by the Rice Assessment Committee. The Full Court had struck out their appeals for non-compliance with section 26 of the Rice Farmers (Security of Tenure) Act and had refused leave to appeal. The CCJ held that an order of the Full Court on appeal from a tribunal falls within section 6(2)(d) of the Court of Appeal Act. Under section 6(3), such an order may be appealed only on the limited questions specified there, or with leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. The Court refused to read section 6(3) as permitting leave "in any other case". That reading would leave a judge free to grant leave even on a question of fact or against a case management order, which would undo the section's purpose of limiting such appeals.
From the Guyana Courts
On 14 August, in Ram v Chief Elections Officer [2019] GLR 277, the Chief Justice (ag) held that the courts have jurisdiction to ensure that the provisions securing the right to vote are properly applied. The CCJ had not ordered elections within three months of 18 June. It had expressly said that it was not its role to set a date. Articles 160(3)(a)(i) and 162 permitted provision for registration, so house-to-house registration did not violate article 106(6) and (7) and was not unconstitutional. GECOM, however, had to act within the constitutional timelines and in the context of a validly passed motion; it could not proceed as though in a normal electoral cycle. Article 159(2) imposes no residency requirement for registration. Removing registered persons from the list merely because they were not registered in the current exercise, unless they were dead or disqualified, would be unconstitutional. The order sought to compel elections by 18 September was refused. On costs, the judge held that re-litigating the date of elections was an abuse of process.
The accounts of Solomon and Ram v Chief Elections Officer are taken from the reports at [2019] GLR 306 and 277. The account of the cement case is taken from the CCJ's judgment.
This commentary is general information, not legal advice.
